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Trademark Surveys: An Undulating Path
Shari Seidman Diamond* & David J. Franklyn**
Introduction
When a plaintiff alleges trademark infringement or claims that false
advertising is likely to confuse or deceive, the pivotal legal question is: how
are consumers likely to perceive the mark or advertising?, In the early days
of trademark litigation, a parade of consumer witnesses, carefully selected
by one of the parties to support a trademark claim, would testify about their
reactions to a mark.2 That approach has given way to systematic survey
evidence reflecting the responses of a substantial number of consumers
selected according to an explicit sampling plan, asked the same questions,
and unaware who sponsored the survey.3
A consumer survey that measures consumer confusion is an effective
way to ensure that trademark infringement cases are decided based on
empirical facts about likely consumer confusion instead of on judicial
assumptions about how consumers are likely to respond. Assume, for
example, that McDonald's Corporation sues a third party that expresses a
plan to start a chain of motels called "McSleep Inns., 4 The attempt to free
ride on the good will of the "Mc" family of marks may be obvious, but are
consumers really likely to think that the motel chain is associated with
McDonald's? The answer may be yes; but it may be no, depending on the
* Howard J. Trienens Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, Northwestern
University; Research Professor, American Bar Foundation. We thank Barton Beebe, Jeremy
Sheff, and Jerre B. Swann for helpful comments on the manuscript.
** Professor, Director of the LL.M. program in IP and Technology Law, and Director of the
McCarthy Institute for IP and Technology Law, University of San Francisco School of Law.
1. 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 32:158 (4th ed. 2014) ("To an extent not true in other fields of law, in trademark and false
advertising disputes the perceptions of large groups of ordinary people are key factual issues.").
2. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 850 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that
eight consumer witnesses were not enough to establish secondary meaning); Premier-Pabst Corp.
v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 760 (D. Conn. 1935) ("[I]ndividual members of the
purchasing public are frequently called as witnesses and questioned as to their mental
reactions .... [B]ut in view of the fact that modem advertising reaches millions, the chancellor,
though he hear a hundred witnesses, can never know whether he has been shown a fairly
representative picture.").
3. Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 359, 372 (3d ed. 2011).
4. This hypothetical is based on an actual case. See generally Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988) (discussing the use of survey evidence to
assess consumer confusion in a trademark dispute over a chain of motels called "McSleep Inns").
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facts and circumstances of the planned third-party use. A well-crafted
survey can help answer this question in a way that grounds trademark law
in fact, rather than conjecture.
Some courts have described surveys as the most direct form of
evidence that can be offered on the consumer perception questions at issue
in trademark and deceptive advertising litigation,5 but several scholars have
questioned the role that surveys actually play in trademark cases.6 These
authors have based their conclusions on reviews of published court
decisions in cases of alleged trademark infringement. Here, we take a
larger view, examining not only varieties of trademark litigation beyond
infringement (e.g., false advertising and dilution), but also investigating (via
a survey!) how attorneys in the United States and internationally use
surveys in trademark litigation. We also identify reasons why many
reported cases do not contain survey evidence even when a survey would be
valuable in supporting or refuting a claim.
The attorney survey we conducted for this Article enables us to
examine how trademark surveys are used not only in cases that find their
way to courtroom dispositions, but also in cases that are disposed of in the
earlier nonpublic stages of litigation and thus do not result in a published
court opinion. The International Trademark Association permitted us to
invite its members to participate in a survey to assess when, if ever, and
under what circumstances attorneys commission trademark surveys and
what role the surveys play in the course of litigation.8 Our results indicate
that trademark surveys often play multiple important roles in the life of a
trademark case. Moreover, these attorney responses reveal the con-
5. See, e.g., Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Co-Rect
Prods., Inc. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1333 n.9 (8th Cir. 1985))
("Consumer surveys are recognized by several circuits as the most direct and persuasive evidence
of secondary meaning."); Malaco Leaf, A.B. v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 355,
379 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("When an advertisement is not literally false, but rather is ambiguous or
implicitly false, a plaintiff can only establish a claim of false advertising through a survey."); see
also Schering Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Surveys are, for example,
routinely admitted in trademark and false advertising cases to show actual confusion, genericness
of a name or secondary meaning."); Kate Spade LLC v. Saturdays Surf LLC, 950 F. Supp. 2d 639,
647 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that on the issue of consumer confusion "it has become routine in
Lanham Act cases to submit such surveys").
6. E.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1581, 1641 (2006); Robert C. Bird & Joel H. Steckel, The Role of
Consumer Surveys in Trademark Infringement: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 14
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1013, 1017 (2012).
7. E.g., Beebe, supra note 6, at 1641; Bird & Steckel, supra note 6, at 1029.
8. The International Trademark Association (1NTA) is a global association of trademark
owners and professionals dedicated to supporting trademarks and related intellectual property.
About INTA, INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N, http://www.inta.org/About/Pages/Overview.aspx. We
are very grateful to Lisa Butkiewicz, Managing Editor at INTA, for arranging to send an email to
1NTA members inviting them to participate.
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siderations that come into play in the decision to commission a survey. A
closer look at the apparent inconsistency between our results and those of
earlier research allows us to assess how pervasive and persuasive surveys
are in trademark litigation and to evaluate how pervasive and persuasive
they ought to be.
Part I provides a description of the primary legal topics that appear in
trademark and deceptive advertising surveys. Part II reviews the recent
studies that investigate the presence and influence of surveys in reported
infringement decisions, identifying some of the limitations of these studies
as a way to describe the role that surveys play in trademark litigation.
Part III takes a close look at a sample of the reported cases that did not
include survey evidence to begin our assessment of why surveys are or are
not submitted in trademark cases. Part IV describes our survey, including a
description of our methodology (the full survey instrument appears in an
Appendix), questions, and results. Part V offers an explanation of why
surveys may be underrepresented in reported cases, and when surveys
succeed and fail as persuasive evidence. We analyze the limitations of
survey methodology in current trademark litigation identified by our
respondents, as well as judicial reactions to surveys that provide clues to the
ambivalence of some judges to the surveys presented in court.
I. Trademark Law and Survey Overview
To provide a framework for the results of our empirical research, we
begin with a description of trademark law. We describe the primary legal
issues that surveys may be used to address in the course of litigation on
trademarks and deceptive advertising.
A trademark is a "word, phrase, symbol or design, or a com-
bination ... [thereof] that identifies and distinguishes the source of the
goods of one party from those of others."9 Trademarks were traditionally
limited to conventional word marks or image marks,' ° but trademark
application has been expanded to include colors," sounds, 12 and even
smells.1 3  The mark, coupled with its associated goodwill, constitutes a
9. Trademark, Copyright or Patent?, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/
trademarks/basics/tradedefin.jsp; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (stating a similar definition,
but using the word "device" rather than the USPTO's use of the word "design").
10. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, On Nontraditional Trademarks, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 17 (2011)
(discussing the historical development of trademark law and noting that trademarks had "almost
exclusively meant design marks" and did not include nontraditional trademarks such as colors).
11. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 171-73 (1995).
12. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7:104.
13. Id. § 7:106.
2014] 2031
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valuable form of intellectual property that may be listed as an asset,
licensed, assigned, sold, and taxed.
14
It is useful to think of a trademark as requiring three elements,
constituting what Barton Beebe has called "the triadic structure of the
trademark" 15: (1) the perceptible symbol; (2) the type of use: "the trademark
must be used. . . [by the source] to refer to goods or services"; and (3) the
function: the trademark must "'identify and distinguish [the manufacturer's]
or seller's goods from goods made or sold by others."'' 16 If consumers do
not see the connection between the mark and the source of the products or
services, the third prong of this relational system is not met. Two central
tasks for trademark surveys are to test whether consumers connect a mark
with goods or services from a particular source and to test the extent to
which that connection is distinctive.'
7
A. Trademark Questions and Survey Evidence
1. Generic Marks.-Unless a mark is viewed as distinctively signaling
a particular source of goods or services, it cannot be protected as a
trademark. 18 Thus, a mark that identifies a category of product or service
rather than a particular brand or source is not eligible as a trademark. 19
These marks are characterized as generic. When a symbol refers to a
product category, competitors may be disadvantaged if they cannot use the
term to refer to their own goods or services, and consumers may be
deprived of a useful way to reduce search costs. To avoid interfering with
the efficient market operation, such a generic mark is not entitled to
trademark protection.2 °
It can be a major point of contention as to whether a mark is viewed as
a brand name or the name of a product category (i.e., generic), particularly
when some consumers use the name of a prominent brand to refer to the
product or service. Not surprisingly, trademark owners engage in vigorous
efforts to distinguish their brand name (e.g., KLEENEX) from the product
14. Id. § 2:21.
15. Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Account of Trademark Doctrine and Trademark Culture, in
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 42, 45 (Graeme
B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008).
16. Id. at 45-46.
17. See infra subpart I(B).
18. See generally Jerre B. Swann, Genericism Rationalized, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 639 (1999),
for a discussion of genericism and trademark infringement.
19. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:1 ("A mark answers the buyer's questions 'Who are
you? Where do you come from?' 'Who vouches for you?' But the [generic] name of the product
answers the question 'What are you?').
20. Id. ("In short, a generic name of a product can never function as a trademark to indicate
origin.").
2032 [Vol. 92:2029
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category (facial tissues), but they are not always successful. 21 If consumer
use changes, a mark that began its life as a brand name may become generic
over time (e.g., cellophane2 2 and aspirin 23). Surveys aimed at assessing
consumer understanding and use of marks have provided relevant evidence
in determining whether a mark is generic since surveys were introduced in a
1962 case to assess whether the mark THERMOS was generic.24
2. Secondary Meaning.-The traditional "spectrum of distinctive-
ness" differentiates between marks that are deemed "inherently distinctive"
and marks that are merely descriptive.25 Inherently distinctive marks are
"suggestive," "arbitrary," or "fanciful" in nature and generate trademark
protection automatically upon their use.26 Fanciful marks are generally
made up words created for the sole purpose of trademark or brand
identification.27 Arbitrary marks are words that exist in language but are
used in an unrelated context.28 Finally, suggestive marks include words that
exist in language and have a generally understood meaning that is
somewhat related to the product 29 but still require some imagination,
thought, or "mental leap.
30
In contrast to inherently distinctive marks, descriptive marks "are
merely descriptive of a product [and] are not inherently distinctive.",31 As
their classification implies, merely descriptive marks describe the type of
product or service and the Supreme Court has held that as such "they do not
inherently identify a particular source, and hence cannot be protected.
32
While the general rule is that a "merely descriptive" mark cannot obtain
21. See, e.g., Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (holding that "pilates" is generic for a form of exercise).
22. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936) (holding that
"cellophane" was generic for cellulose-based plastic film).
23. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that "aspirin"
was generic for acetylsalicylic acid).
24. Am. Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 207 F. Supp. 9, 20 (D. Conn. 1962). For a
review of genericness surveys, see E. Deborah Jay, Genericness Surveys in Trademark Disputes:
Under the Gavel, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
DESIGN 101 (Shari Seidman Diamond & Jerre B. Swann eds., 2012).
25. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11: 1.
26. Id.; Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
27. E.g., KODAK, Registration No. 2,040,245 (cameras); XEROX, Registration No.
3,719,198 (photocopiers).
28. E.g., APPLE, Registration No. 3,928,818 (computers); CAMEL, Registration No.
1,502,414 (cigarettes).
29. E.g., IVORY SOAP, Registration No. 0054,415 (soap); TIDE, Registration No. 4,462,346
(detergent).
30. Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 59 F.3d 902,
911 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a mark is not suggestive where "[n]o mental leap is required").




trademark protection, it is possible for a descriptive trademark to acquire
"secondary meaning" through use in commerce and thereby "acquire the
distinctiveness which will allow them to be protected., 33 In essence, the
mark holder must show that consumers have come to recognize and accept
the mark as denoting only one exclusive source.34 Thus, if consumers come
to associate a descriptive mark with a single source (e.g., WORLD BOOK for
an encyclopedia), even if they cannot name the source (e.g., the source of
WORLD BOOK is Scott Fetzer, a Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary), the mark
can qualify as a source indicator that warrants trademark status.
The question of whether a descriptive mark has achieved secondary
meaning is important both in the bulk of litigation that takes place before
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) in office actions to
determine whether a descriptive mark qualifies for trademark protection
through registration on the Principal Register35 and in trademark
infringement litigation in federal court. Although circumstantial measures
are often used to support a claim of secondary meaning (e.g., "amount and
manner of advertising" and "volume of sales"), surveys provide direct
evidence on the relevant legal question: whether the relevant consuming
public has come to identify the mark as denoting source.36
3. Likelihood of Confusion.-Trademark law is commonly justified as
serving two principal goals: (1) consumer protection and (2) mark owner
protection. 37 There is an ongoing and lively debate over the foundations of
trademark law,38 but such matters are well beyond the scope of this Article.
Suffice it to say that in terms of consumer protection, trademarks serve the
obvious function of preventing consumer deception 39 and the less obvious,
but widely accepted, function of reducing consumer search costs.
40
33. Id.
34. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:25 ("Trademark protection for descriptive marks is
extended only in recognition of consumer acceptance and recognition of such marks as denoting
only one seller or source.").
35. 3 id. § 19:10 (describing eligibility for the Principal Register).
36. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th Cir. 1983).
37. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:2 ("Trademark law serves to protect both consumers
from deception and confusion over trade symbols and to protect the plaintiff's infringed trademark
as property.").
38. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1840-41 (2007) (arguing that consumer protection is a secondary goal to
mark owner protection). Contra Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90
VA. L. REv. 2099, 2100 (2004) (arguing that the central function of protecting trademarks is to
benefit consumers).
39. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:4 ("Trademarks fix responsibility. Without marks, a
seller's mistakes or low quality products would be untraceable to their source.").
40. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d 735,
739 (7th Cir. 2013) ("A trademark's value is the saving in search costs made possible by the
2034 [Vol. 92:2029
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Trademarks come to function as representations of manufacturer quality
assurance, and thus consumers use them as shortcuts to rapidly identify and
purchase the types of goods they want without having to research them. In
authorizing federal actions for trademark infringement,41 Congress enabled
the federal courts to protect consumers from deception when the trademark
holder proves that the use of a mark is likely to cause confusion.
Trademark law also offers the mark holder a potent sword against
infringement. Trademarks can be the most valuable assets on a
corporation's budget sheet,42 and courts regularly recognize that value.43
Competitors are tempted to free ride by creating marks that mimic, imitate,
or confuse." Trademark law gives the mark holder a mechanism to stop
competitors from using such infringing marks. The crux of the legal
analysis revolves around whether the infringing mark is likely to cause
confusion among consumers.45  And therein lies the central value of
consumer surveys in trademark infringement litigation: In the absence of
difficult-to-obtain evidence of actual confusion, how can we know whether
consumers are likely to be confused unless we examine consumer
reaction?
46
The statutory test for consumer confusion is deceptively
straightforward. A plaintiff needs to show that defendant is using a mark
information that the trademark conveys about the quality of the trademark owner's brand."); Ty
Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The fundamental purpose of a trademark is
to reduce consumer search costs .. "); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:5 ("[T]rademarks reduce
the customer's cost of acquiring information about products and services.").
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012).
42. Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks-From Signals to
Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 301-03 (1992).
43. See, e.g., DHL Corp. v. Comm'r, 285 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding a Tax
Court valuation of the "DHL" trademark at $100 million); Nestle Holdings, Inc. v. Comm'r, 152
F.3d 83, 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating the Tax Court's $150,300,000 valuation of Nestle's
trademarks and trade names because the valuation methodology used did not encompass all
relevant factors).
44. See generally David J. Franldyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent
Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117
(2004) [hereinafter Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine] (identifying the anti-free-riding
impulse in trademark law as a "decisive, yet unstated, factor in many reported dilution cases");
David J. Franklyn, The New Federal Anti-Dilution Act: Reinstating the Myth of "Likely" Dilutive
Harm as a Mask for Anti-Free-Rider Liability, 11 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 199 (2007) [hereinafter
Franldyn, The New Federal Anti-Dilution Act] (arguing that dilution law is really about the
prevention of problematic free riding, or "taking unfair advantage" of a famous brand).
45. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:8 ("[T]he keystone... [of] trademarks is the avoidance
of the likelihood of confusion in the minds of the buying public.").
46. Shari Seidman Diamond & Jerre B. Swann, Editors' Introduction: Surveys in Modern
Litigation Involving Trademarks and Deceptive Advertising, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE
ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN, supra note 24, at 3, 3 ("Thus, it was natural
that surveys would become a standard form of evidence-perhaps the standard form of
evidence-on consumer perception in cases involving trademarks and deceptive advertising.").
2014] 2035
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that is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 4 7 In
order to measure likelihood of confusion, each circuit has developed a
multifactor test that measures up to twelve different factors. The Second
Circuit's eight-factor Polaroid test 48 is often credited as the first and
"immensely influential" multifactor test.49 The Ninth Circuit uses a similar
eight-factor Sleekcraft test, which shares the most common factors,
including the core examination into the "strength of the mark," "proximity
of the goods," and "similarity of the marks."50
Importantly, "[e]vidence of [a]ctual [c]onfusion" is a weighty factor in
every single circuit.5 1 These four factors form the core inquiry into any
trademark infringement action,52 even though most circuits augment the test
with additional factors, such as marketing channels used, sophistication of
customers, and likelihood of product expansion. 3 In any case, recent
studies suggest that factors beyond the first four are virtually
inconsequential.54
Trademark law considers three main types of evidence for evaluating
the likelihood of confusion: survey evidence, direct evidence, and argument
by inference. 5 Direct evidence is often considered the strongest evidence
and includes testimony by confused consumers or misdirected letters.56 But
substantial and reliable direct evidence of actual deception may be difficult
to find. If the junior user has just begun to market his product, an
47. 15U.S.C. § 1114 (2012).
48. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). The Polaroid
eight-factor test considers the following factors:
[T]he strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the
proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap,
actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own
mark, the quality of defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers.
Id.
49. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:32.
50. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). The Sleekcraft
eight-factor test considers the following factors:
1. [S]trength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of the marks;
4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. type of goods and the
degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7. defendant's intent in
selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
Id.
51. Bird & Steckel, supra note 6, at 1050 tbl.l.
52. See Beebe, supra note 6, at 1589 ("Common to all of the circuits' tests are four factors:
the similarity of the marks, the proximity of the goods, evidence of actual confusion, and the
strength of the plaintiff's mark.").
53. Bird & Steckel, supra note 6, 1050 tbl.1.
54. See infra subparts II(A), (C).
55. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:63. McCarthy refers to direct evidence as "[e]vidence
of actual confusion." Id.
56. Id. § 23:13.
2036 [Vol. 92:2029
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infringement action may be brought to prevent consumer confusion that has
not yet occurred in the marketplace from taking place, so no direct evidence
of confusion will yet exist. 57 If the marks have coexisted for some time,
some consumers who have been confused may not be aware of the
deception and others may not complain or be willing to step forward.5 8 The
motives of employees or friends who report evidence of deception may be
suspect,59 producing evidence that is susceptible to criticism.
The alternative to direct evidence is survey evidence, which can
measure whether an appreciable number of relevant consumers are likely to
be confused by a mark that may or may not already be in the marketplace,
and offers "an economical and systematic way to gather information and
draw inferences about a large number of individuals." 60 Courts have long
accepted survey evidence on a variety of issues; their validity and
admissibility (assuming proper survey design
61) is black letter law. 62
In a survey assessing likelihood of confusion, consumers are exposed
to the allegedly infringing mark and their reactions are measured. The
identity of the relevant consumer population, the nature of the mark, and the
circumstances under which a consumer would encounter the mark
determine the design of an appropriate survey. Over time, courts and
researchers have come to recognize that the question in a likelihood-of-
confusion survey is a causal one and that survey-experiments using control
groups are appropriate for likelihood-of-confusion surveys in order to
provide trustworthy evidence on whether or not the allegedly infringing
mark is likely to cause confusion.63 As a result, survey design has evolved
so that surveys now typically include controls designed to rule out
competing explanations for consumer responses other than confusion
57. Id. § 23:12; Mark D. Robins, Actual Confusion in Trademark Infringement Litigation:
Restraining Subjectivity Through a Factor-Based Approach to Valuing Evidence, 2 N.W. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 117, 129-30 (2004).
58. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:12.
59. Robins, supra note 57, at 215; Dan Sarel & Howard Marmorstein, The Effect of Consumer
Surveys and Actual Confusion Evidence in Trademark Litigation: An Empirical Assessment, 99
TRADEMARK REP. 1416, 1432 (2009).
60. Diamond, Reference Guide, supra note 3, at 364.
61. See generally id. (discussing all of the issues that factor into the determination of whether
a survey is properly designed).
62. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 32:158; Diamond, supra note 3, 365.
63. See, e.g., Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384, 448
(D.N.J. 2009) (criticizing a survey's design for failure to use "an adequate control mechanism");
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 339, 351-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (same); P&G
Pharms., Inc. v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 0034, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64363, at
*91 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (same); Simon Prop. Grp. L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d
1033, 1045-51 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (same); Nat'l Football League Props., Inc. v. ProStyle, Inc., 57 F.
Supp. 2d 665, 668 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (same); see also Diamond, supra note 3, at 399-400, 421




caused by the allegedly infringing mark. The quality of the survey depends
on the appropriateness of the design choices, including the choice of the
control stimulus.
64
4. Deceptive Advertising.-If a party demonstrates that an
advertisement is literally false, it is unnecessary to show evidence of
consumer reaction to the advertisement to sustain a claim of deceptive
advertising. 65 Courts, however, rarely find challenged claims to be literally
false, so the parties may conduct surveys to assess what message consumers
are taking from an advertisement in order to persuade the court that
consumers are (or are not) being misled by an advertisement.66 As with a
likelihood-of-confusion survey, a series of methodological decisions will
determine the quality of the survey, including the selection of an
appropriate control.67
5. Dilution.-When the owner of a trademark alleges likelihood of
dilution, the owner of the mark must prove that the mark is famous,
meaning that it is "widely recognized by the general consuming public of
the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the
mark's owner., 68  As with proof of secondary meaning, evidence may
include indirect evidence from volume of advertising and sales; surveys of
brand awareness provide direct evidence of fame.69
One factor a court may consider in determining whether a mark or
trade name is likely to cause dilution by blurring is "[a]ny actual association
between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. 70  Surveys
measuring the associations that the allegedly diluting mark is likely to
engender are a fairly recent development, reflecting the relative infancy of
the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA), which was passed in
October of 2006.71 Moreover, there is substantial controversy regarding the
64. Diamond, supra note 3, at 399; see also Shari Seidman Diamond, Control Foundations:
Rationale and Approaches, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND DESIGN, supra note 24, at 201, 212 [hereinafter, Diamond, Control Foundations]
(discussing features that characterize an appropriate control).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012); Bruce P. Keller, Survey Evidence in False Advertising
Cases, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN,
supra note 24, at 167, 160-69.
66. Keller, supra note 65, at 169.
67. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
69. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iii); see Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.,
633 F.3d 1158, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting the use of surveys and volume of advertising as
evidence that a mark was famous).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(vi).
71. See id. § 1125(c).
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form that these surveys should take (i.e., what questions are appropriate to
reflect spontaneous association) and what beyond association might be
required to demonstrate likelihood of impaired distinctiveness.
72
Nonetheless, association surveys are increasingly appearing as a component
of proof in dilution cases.73 As with other surveys, methodological
decisions, including the choice of a control, affect the value of association
surveys.
B. The Overall Role of Surveys in Trademark and Deceptive Advertising
Law
A unique facet of trademark law is that the critical factual inquiry
invariably revolves around consumer perception and reaction.74 The bulk of
trademark disputes require proving secondary meaning75 or consumer
confusion,76 and establishing each relies on showing that the relevant
consuming public holds certain perceptions about a mark.77  In terms of
proving secondary meaning, consumer surveys are virtually indispensable. 78
Similarly, when the generic nature of a mark is in question or when a
competitor alleges that an advertisement is misleading, assessments of
72. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Surveys in Dilution Cases II, in TRADEMARK AND
DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN, supra note 24, at 155, 157-62
(discussing the difficulties of producing surveys that measure spontaneous association and assess
whether association is likely to impair distinctiveness of a mark); Jerre B. Swann, Dilution
Surveys Under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE
ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN, supra note 24, at 145, 154 (concluding that
impaired distinctiveness is generally "cognitively inferred from fame, similarity, substantially
exclusive use, and association"); Jerre B. Swann, Swann's Rebuttal to Diamond, in TRADEMARK
AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN, supra note 24, at 163,
163-65 (proposing a five-factor test for impaired distinctiveness based on the text of the TDRA).
73. E.g., Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int'l, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1820 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
74. Diamond & Swann, supra note 46, at 3 ("[Clonsumer reaction is the gravamen of
infringement."); accord MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 32:158 ("Both trademark validity and
infringement turn largely on factual issues of customer perception."); see also Jacob Jacoby &
Lynda Zadra-Symes, Legal Issues That Can Be Examined Via Survey, in 1 TRADEMARK
SURVEYS: DESIGNING, IMPLEMENTING, AND EVALUATION SURVEYS 3, at 5 (2013) (discussing the
central role of the mental state of consumers in trademark litigation).
75. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 15:30 (discussing how to prove secondary meaning).
76. 4 id. § 23:63 (discussing how to prove likelihood of confusion).
77. Diamond, supra note 3, at 366 ("The pivotal legal question in such cases virtually
demands survey research because it centers on consumer perception and memory (i.e., is the
consumer likely to be confused about the source of a product, or does the advertisement imply a
false or misleading message?).").
78. Co-Rect Prods., Inc. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1333 n.9 (8th
Cir. 1985) ("Consumer surveys are recogjdnized by several circuits as the most direct and
persuasive evidence of secondary meaning."); accord Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. &
Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 312 (6th Cir. 2001); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 15:42 ("One of the
most scientific methods of determining the mental associations of the relevant purchaser class is to
conduct a survey of the purchasers themselves.").
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consumer perceptions are key. Finally, when likelihood of dilution is
alleged, surveys are increasingly appearing in litigation to measure fame
and association." In the adversarial context of proving infringement or
deceptive advertising, the use of consumer surveys has long been held an
appropriate, if not a practically compulsory, 81 method of proving several
factors-particularly "actual consumer confusion.,
82
II. Studies of Presence and Influence of Surveys in Infringement
Decisions
Over time, the use of surveys in trademark and deceptive advertising
has grown. According to one account, only 18 surveys were offered in
reported cases in the fifteen years between 1946 and 1960, growing to 86
surveys between 1961 and 1975 (approximately 6 per year).83 Between
1976 to 1990, 442 surveys were presented in reported cases (29 per year);
between 1991 and 2005, 742 surveys were offered (approximately 49 per
year on average); and in the seven years between 2006 and 2012, about 315
surveys appeared in reported cases (approximately 45 per year).84
79. For cases involving fame surveys, see, for example, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011); Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n v. JSL Corp., 590 F.
Supp. 2d 1306, 1315 (D. Nev. 2008). For cases involving association surveys, see, for example,
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009); Nike, Inc. v.
Nikepal Int'l, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1820 (E.D. Cal. 2007); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. AFP
Imaging Corp., 2011 TTAB LEXIS 378 *26-28 (T.T.A.B. 2011).
80. Diamond, supra note 3, at 363-66.
81. Morrison Entm't Grp. Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 56 F. App'x 782, 785 (9th Cir. 2003)
("Although Morrison is not required to conduct a survey in order to demonstrate actual confusion,
such surveys are often used by plaintiffs to bolster their cases."); Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v.
Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 475 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Similarly, a plaintiffs failure to
conduct such a survey where it has the financial resources to do so, could lead a jury to infer that
the plaintiff believes the results of the survey will be unfavorable."); Gimix, Inc. v. JS&A Grp.,
Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1005, 1006 (N.D. I11. 1982) ("Neither side in this case has produced any
consumer surveys or other similar evidence. Both sides are at fault for such laxness."); Sandra
Edelman, Failure to Conduct A Survey in Trademark Infringement Cases: A Critique of the
Adverse Inference, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 746, 747 (2000) ("[S]urvey evidence has become de
rigueur in trademark infringement cases. Indeed, many courts will draw an adverse inference
against a plaintiff on the issue of likely confusion if a survey is not introduced.").
82. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987). But see
MCCARTHY, supra note 1 § 32:184 (arguing that surveys are circumstantial evidence of actual
confusion and "do not measure the degree of actual confusion by real consumers making mistaken
purchases").
83. Gerald L. Ford, Survey Percentages in Lanham Act Matters, in TRADEMARK AND
DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN, supra note 24, at 311, 312 n.3.
84. Id. This count was updated through 2012 by Gerald L. Ford for a presentation at the
McCarthy Law Symposium. Presentation by Shari Diamond, et al., Survey Evidence: Crunching
the Numbers (Feb. 28, 2013), available at http://www.mccarthyinstitute.org/panel-pdfs/empirical-
workmaurerdiamondford.pdf.
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Based on some claims about the crucial role of surveys, one would be
forgiven for believing that every trademark case ended in a dramatic
introduction of survey evidence serving as the smoking gun. But recent
empirical studies published by accomplished scholars call that belief into
question.85 Several studies have been conducted in the last decade, with the
most recent concluding: "survey evidence is used infrequently, treated
subjectively, and has the potential to be either dispositive or useless
depending on the context of the underlying evidence., 86  Our empirical
research sheds light on why commentators can reach such different
conclusions.
A. Barton Beebe Breaks Ground, 2006
When Beebe surveyed the state of American trademark law in 2005, he
found it "in a severe state of disrepair. Its current condition is Babelian. '87
He was referring to the multifactor likelihood-of-confusion test and all of its
various manifestations, different in each of the thirteen circuits. 88  He
identified 331 published federal trademark opinions from 2000-2004 that
made substantial use of a multifactor-confusion test,89 and his findings are
dramatic. 90 He reviewed each opinion and coded whether the decision
resulted in a finding of likelihood of confusion, whether the court
considered each factor, and whether the court characterized the factor as
favoring or not favoring a finding of likelihood of confusion.91 Based on
his analysis, be characterized the Second Circuit as prodefendant 92 and the
Ninth Circuit as proplaintiff.
93
Beebe wanted to know which factors in the likelihood-of-confusion
test were most important.94 As in many other studies of decision making,
he was able to predict decisions on likelihood of confusion based on
85. Beebe, supra note 6, at 1586; Bird & Steckel, supra note 6, at 1017-18. But see Sarel &
Marmorstein, supra note 59, at 1419 (challenging Beebe's methodology in An Empirical Study of
the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement). See also infra subpart II(D) (pointing to other
studies agreeing that survey use is not routine).
86. Bird & Steckel, supra note 6, at 1017-18.
87. Beebe, supra note 6, at 1582.
88. Id. at 1582-83.
89. Id. at 1649-50 app. A. Beebe excluded all cases involving counterfeit marks or "an
alleged breach of a franchising, licensing, or distribution agreement." Id. at 1650 app. A.
90. See id. at 1597. Beebe only studied "federal trademark infringement cases that produced
written opinions available from the Westlaw and Lexis databases." Id.
91. Id. at 1650-52 app. A.
92. Id. at 1597 (observing a 37% "plaintiff multifactor test win rate" in the circuit compared
to 51% across all other circuits).
93. Id. (observing a 64% plaintiff multifactor test win rate in the circuit compared to 43%
across all other circuits).
94. Id. at 1598 ("It is something of a pastime in trademark law to speculate on which factors,
if any, drive the outcome of the multifactor test and how the factors interact.").
20141 2041
Texas Law Review [Vol. 92:2029
judicial assessments of just a few factors, 95 most prominently the similarity
of the marks and proximity of the goods.9 6 Using simply the court's
assessment of similarity and proximity, Beebe was able to predict case
preliminary injunction decisions and bench trial outcomes with a high
degree of accuracy.97
His finding that similarity of marks is the single most important
factor98 makes intuitive sense. When marks are extremely similar, the
situation borders the realm of counterfeiting and free riding, which usually
tends to overpower other factors. 99 But Beebe also identified two other
influential factors: the defendant's intent when it favored a likelihood of
confusion,'00 and the proximity of the parties' goods when that factor
disfavored a likelihood of confusion.'0 ' He also concluded that the intent
and actual confusion factors "exert an inordinate degree of influence" on
the outcome of the rest of the factors. 10 2 Moreover, the similarity of the
marks and defendant intent were weighted so strongly by judges that they
could trigger a finding of confusion despite the outcomes of any other
factors.03 In essence, Beebe described this as a "stampeding" effect and a
by-product of "coherence-based reasoning."' 1 4  He theorized that judges
essentially looked at just a few factors to decide infringement and then
rationalized the rest in order to obtain a coherent outcome.
105
95. See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 41 (1980) (discussing how judgment heuristics can cause
people to attribute greater weight to certain types of information than others when making
judgments); JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, THE CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISION: NEW DIMENSIONS
OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS 67 (1974) ("The cybernetic decision maker is sensitive to information
only if it enters through an established highly focused feedback channel, and hence many factors
which do in fact affect the outcomes have no effect in his decision process."). For a list of
empirical studies of judicial decision making supporting this notion, see Beebe, supra note 6, at
1601 n.88.
96. Beebe, supra note 6, at 1603.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1623 ("[T]he similarity of the marks factor is by far the most important factor in the
multifactor test.").
99. See Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine, supra note 44, at 118 (describing how
"judges and juries seek to... punish free-riding").
100. Beebe, supra note 6, at 1600, 1610.
101. Id. at 1608 ("As a practical matter, in order to win the multifactor test, the plaintiffmust
not lose.. . [the proximity of goods] factor-or alternatively, when the judge finds an overall
likelihood of confusion, the judge almost invariably finds that the proximity factor favors this
result.").
102. Id. at 1600.
103. Id. at 1607.
104. Id. at 1614-15. See generally Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box. Cognitive
Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 511 (2004) (describing the use of
"coherence-based reasoning" in legal decision making).
105. Beebe, supra note 6, at 1614-15.
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According to the model of judicial decisionmaking that Beebe
presents, "survey evidence, thought by many to be highly influential, is in
practice of little importance. ' 0 6 He found that only sixty-five (20%) of the
331 opinions he studied discussed survey evidence'0 7 and thirty-four (10%)
credited the survey evidence. 108 Although the rulings in 70% of those cases
favored the credited survey, those twenty-four cases represented only 7% of
the opinions he studied. 0 9 Beebe expressed surprise at the low overall
proportion of reported cases that involved surveys, although he suggested
that the time required to conduct a survey meant that most trademark
litigation resolved before trial was unlikely to involve surveys." 0
Beebe ultimately concluded that judges were indeed shortcircuiting the
multifactor balancing test, relying on two or three of the factors (at least
similarity of marks and proximity of goods in almost all cases) in a "take
the best" strategy that seems to result in what Beebe characterized as an
"altogether successful-and rational-approach to decision making.""'
We suggest that an additional process may be occurring. In using
coherence-based reasoning, judges may evaluate factors to be consistent
with the outcome they favor on other grounds. For example, faced with a
persuasive survey that shows evidence of likelihood of confusion, the marks
may appear more similar than they might have appeared in the absence of
the survey. In that case, it would not be the similarity of the marks, but
rather the survey, that led to a finding of likelihood of confusion.
Beebe's coding approach relied on the decisions that the judges made
on each factor and he assumed that the judges evaluated each of the major
factors independently. Yet, as he observed, the decisions on the less
prominent factors tended to match the decisions on the two or three factors
he identified as determinative. 12  Thus, his analysis of stampeding
acknowledges the possibility that the judgments reached on each factor are
not independent, and indeed his own analysis calls into question the causal
ordering of these judicial decisions on likelihood of confusion.
We walk away from Beebe's work agreeing that the courts do not
practice what they preach in Beebe's study; the multifactor tests are
smokescreens for "fast and frugal" heuristics that create the appearance of
106. Id. at 1622.
107. Id. at 1641.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1642 ("It may be objected that trademark litigation is typically resolved at the
preliminary injunction stage before either party has had the time or can be expected to conduct a
creditable survey .... [I]t is still striking that survey evidence played a relatively minor role even
in the bench trial context.").




consensus by producing coherence among three relatively subjective factors
(similarity, intent, and proximity)." 13 What is less clear is just how that
coherence is created.
B. Sarel and Marmorstein Scrutinize Beebe's Findings, 2009
Professors Sarel and Marmorstein performed their own study in 2009
with the goal of determining the effect of survey evidence in trademark
infringement cases in which likelihood of confusion was the central issue."l
4
Dissatisfied with Beebe's approach 1 5 they analyzed 126 cases decided
between 2001 and 2006 in which the plaintiff possessed an "undisputed,
valid trademark."' 1 6  By focusing on these cases, questions about
genericism or lack of secondary meaning that might make a survey about
confusion legally irrelevant would not affect the outcome of the case.
Using independent coders to assess whether the marks were similar or
dissimilar and whether the goods were sold in high or low proximity, they
also determined whether the plaintiff had presented a survey and, if so,
whether the court had admitted or rejected it. " 7 Their results on the use and
efficacy of surveys differed dramatically from those of Beebe. In
approximately one-third of the cases studied (34.1%), plaintiffs offered
likelihood-of-confusion surveys 1" 8 and the results suggest substantial impact
in cases in which the parties' marks or goods or services are dissimilar." 9
Sarel and Marmorstein's study showed that the admission of survey
evidence increased the success rate on a likelihood-of-confusion issue by
24.2%.120 When the plaintiff had survey evidence admitted and the
trademarks or goods were dissimilar, use of survey evidence significantly
increased plaintiff success in obtaining an injunction (by about 60%). 121
113. Id at 1586-87, 1600, 1617.
114. Sarel & Marmorstein, supra note 59, at 1430 ("The goal of this study is to help plaintiffs
determine the importance and value of presenting actual confusion evidence and/or surveys in
trademark infringement litigation.").
115. Id. at 1419 ("The methodology Beebe employed is unorthodox and the findings are open
to different interpretations.").
116. Id. at 1422-23.
117. Id. at 1435. They also coded whether actual confusion evidence had been presented and,
if so, whether it was weak or strong. Id.
118. Id. at 1431.
119. Id. at 1433.
120. Id. at 1426-27 ("In 76.0 percent of cases in which survey evidence was presented and
admitted, injunctions were granted. These results are significantly higher than for the 'None'
category, in which the plaintiffs prevailed in 51.8 percent of cases ... .
121. Id. at 1433. Professors Sarel and Marmorstein found:
In cases involving parties with dissimilar trademarks, plaintiffs prevailed in only
4 percent of the cases in which a survey was not presented, 0 percent in which the
plaintiff's survey was rejected, and 61.5 percent in which the plaintiffs survey was
admitted. In cases involving dissimilar goods or services, the plaintiffs prevailed in
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Where the marks were dissimilar, it was almost impossible to obtain an
injunction without a survey-only 4% of plaintiffs were able to obtain an
injunction without the use of a survey in such instances, whereas 61.5%
obtained an injunction with a survey. And if the survey was rejected, no
plaintiff succeeded in obtaining an injunction. 123 Even where the goods and
marks were similar, the admission of surveys increased win rates by
approximately 170/o-20%. 124
But how could Sarel and Marmorstein reach such dramatically
different results from Beebe? It is difficult to tell, but Beebe relied on
judicial conclusions about the similarity of the marks and the proximity of
the goods. By using two independent coders to assess factors like the
similarity of the marks, 125 Sarel and Marmorstein reduced the likelihood
that the survey results would artificially influence the way the factors were
categorized, avoiding a spurious match to the survey results that Beebe
recognized might have occurred with the judges. Moreover, by focusing on
cases in which the validity of the mark was undisputed, they studied
precisely the cases in which likelihood of confusion would be the central
issue. There is one important area in which the two studies converge:
Beebe argued that the similarity of marks was nearly dispositive, so it
makes sense that surveys would be more useful when marks are less
similar. That, of course, is what Sarel and Marmorstein found.
126
C. Bird and Steckel Renew the Inquiry, 2012
The most recent empirical study of surveys returns to the theme of
little impact for surveys involving likelihood of confusion. 127 Professors
Bird and Steckel used Beebe's data set as a starting point and then
expanded it with 202 additional cases from 2005-2006, for a total of 533
federal opinions from 2000-2006.128 Again, they used only published
opinions available on Westlaw and LexisNexis. 129 Their research goal was
only 27.3 percent of cases in which a survey was not presented, 0 percent in which
the plaintiff's survey was rejected, and 85.7 percent in which plaintiff's survey was
admitted.
Id.
122. Id. at 1428.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1433 ("[When] the parties had similar trademarks, plaintiffs prevailed in 72.4
percent of cases without surveys and in 91.7 percent of cases with admitted surveys. Likewise, in
cases involving similar goods and services, plaintiffs prevailed in 55.6 percent [of
cases] ... without surveys and 72.2 percent of cases with admitted surveys.").
125. Id. at 1423.
126. Id. at 1433.
127. Bird & Steckel, supra note 6, at 1035.
128. Id. at 1029-30.
129. Id. at 1031.
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to evaluate "what impact surveys have on the outcome of court cases."13
Ultimately, they concluded that consumer surveys are neither "universally
influential" nor "used as often as some would imply."
131
Bird and Steckel found that 16.6% of the 533 cases discussed survey
evidence (representing a decline from Beebe's original 20%).132 From this,
they concluded that "consumer surveys are not especially useful in
likelihood of confusion cases., 133 Many of their findings, however, actually
corroborate Sarel and Marmorstein's. For instance, Bird and Steckel found
that where the marks were similar but the products were dissimilar, the
introduction of survey evidence "represents an apparent 76.7% increase in
the probability that a likelihood of confusion finding will occur."'
34
Overall, they found that surveys were not used in the majority of cases
and that their actual effect varied greatly depending on the weight of other
evidence and the factual circumstances. 35  To that end, their findings
supported Beebe's conclusion that three factors of the multifactor test were
disproportionately influential. 36  The predicted outcomes on these core
factors can serve as navigation points for survey usefulness. 37 They also
found that it was in close cases that surveys were most useful; 38 in cases
where the plaintiffs key non-survey evidence was especially strong or
weak, the survey was either redundant or insufficient.'
39
Bird and Steckel recognized that their study of published cases did not
permit them to measure the role that surveys played in cases that settled. 4 °
They theorized it was likely that "surveys play a very different role in cases
that settle" and admitted that their "estimate of the degree to which they are
used [in settlement] could be vastly understated. ,141 To this end, they
hypothesized a number of roles that surveys could play in the pretrial stage,
such as determining the viability of a lawsuit or leveraging favorable
settlements. 42 Lacking any further data on pretrial usage, however, they
130. Id. at 1029.
131. Id. at 1048.
132. Compare id. at 1035, with Beebe, supra note 6, at 1641.
133. Bird & Steckel, supra note 6, at 1035.
134. Id. at 1041. Compare id., with Sarel & Mormorstein, supra note 59, at 1433.
135. Bird & Steckel, supra note 6, at 1043-46.
136. Id. at 1045-46.
137. Id. at 1042-43 (describing a matrix of potential multifactor outcomes and the correlating
benefit or "impact" of a survey in each measured against the cost of a survey).
138. Id. at 1041 ("Surveys seem to be most helpful to plaintiffs when non-survey proof is of
middling strength.").
139. Id. at 1041-42.
140. Id. at 1047.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1036.
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could not assess whether survey usage in federal court misrepresented the
role of surveys in trademark-related disputes. 1
43
D. Other Studies Find Agreement that Survey Use Is Not Routine
Empirical studies into survey use are by no means an untouched field
of study. Dozens of scholars have examined court decisions to assess the
role of surveys. Graeme W. Austin studied cases over a ten-year period
(1993-2003) and found that surveys were introduced in 57.4% of trademark
infringement cases that went to final judgment.14 4 He concluded that the
surveys influenced the result in 35.2% of cases.14 5  Jacoby and Morrin
studied cases from 1994 to 1997 and reported that courts were generally
skeptical of survey evidence.14 6 Kevin Blum, Ariel Fox, Christina Hayes,
and James Xu studied 224 infringement cases in the Southern District of
New York from 1994-2008 with "[t]he goal of testing Beebe's results over
a longer period of time.' i4 7 They too found results "consistent with Beebe's
national study."'' 48  They concluded: "survey data is less frequently
employed than one might expect given the conventional wisdom that survey
evidence is routinely employed to prove a likelihood of confusion."'
49
The consensus in all of these studies is that survey data is neither
omnipresent nor likely to be as important as some other factors when it
appears in published opinions. But before we conclude that surveys play an
unimportant role in trademark litigation it is worth considering the role it is
reasonable to expect surveys to play. First, what roles do they-should
they-play in the stages that precede court hearings? Second, how much
survey activity is warranted where marks are highly similar, the proximity
of the goods is high, or there is evidence of intent to free ride? The plaintiff
may reasonably believe that further proof is unnecessary. Why then would
we expect a survey? Third, how often are competent and defensible
surveys offered as evidence? If a survey is not competently done, why
should we expect it to be influential?
143. Id.
144. Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827,
867-69 (2004).
145. Id. at 867.
146. Jacob Jacoby & Maureen Morrin, "Not Manufactured or Authorized by... ": Recent
Federal Cases Involving Trademark Disclaimers, 17 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 97, 100, 103
(1998).
147. Kevin Blum et al., Consistency of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year Revisiting of Barton
Beebe's Empirical Analysis of Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 2010 STAN. TECH.






Thus, the real empirical questions worth asking are: how often and
with what effect are surveys conducted when other evidence is ambiguous
and survey evidence can be probative-of likelihood of confusion or of
other trademark issues? We cannot answer all of these questions here, but
we can provide evidence that suggests a larger role for surveys than is
reflected in the previous studies of published opinions.
Il1. Reported Cases Without Survey Evidence
We begin by looking closely at a sample of reported cases in which
surveys were not offered. The article by Graeme W. Austin, who studied
cases over a ten-year period (1993-2003), provided the names of 23 federal
cases in his sample in which no survey evidence was offered.1 50 We looked
closely at each of these cases for cues to the absence of survey evidence and
the court's perspective on it.
In seven cases, the plaintiff presented evidence of instances of actual
confusion that the court found persuasive1 5' or stipulated to absence of
actual confusion. 52 In three cases, the defendant's mark was identical or
nearly identical to that of the plaintiff' 53 or the defendant was a licensee
whose conduct went beyond the scope of the license agreement.
1 54
Assuming that these cases are representative of those in which scholars
have not found surveys, these categories offer some explanation for why no
survey was presented. With good evidence of actual confusion, no dispute
about its absence, or nearly identical marks, a survey may be unnecessary or
irrelevant, and these categories account for almost half (10/23 = 43%) of the
no-survey cases.
In seven other cases, the court explicitly commented on the absence of
a survey (e.g., "Planet Hollywood has offered no survey evidence on the
question of whether there would likely be any confusion by consumers
150. Austin, supra note 144, at 868 n.175.
151. E.g., Quantum Fitness Corp. v. Quantum Lifestyle Ctrs., 83 F. Supp. 2d 810, 830 (S.D.
Tex. 1999) (granting preliminary injunction and holding that "Quantum Fitness has submitted
competent evidence of actual confusion"). See also Locomotor USA, Inc. v. Korus Co., No. 93-
56032, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 401, at *22 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 1995); Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc. v.
Pocono Mountain Speedway, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 427, 441 (M.D. Pa. 2001); Patsy's Brand Inc.
v. .O.B. Realty Inc., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Rainforest Cafe, Inc. v.
Amazon, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 886, 903 (D. Minn. 1999); Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Manny's
Porshop, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
152. Banfi Prods. Corp. v. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 2d 188, 198 (E.D.N.Y.
1999).
153. E.g., Apple Corps. v. Button Master, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(involving "pin-on buttons featuring the name and likeness of The Beatles"); see also Calvin
Klein Jeanswear Co. v. Tunnel Trading, No. 98 Civ. 5408, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18738, at *28
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2001).
154. Hard Rock Caf6 Int'l (USA) Inc. v. Morton, No. 97 Civ. 9483, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8340, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1999).
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between Planet Hollywood restaurants and Hollywood Casino's operations"
(denying injunction); 5 5 "[plaintiff has] yet to conduct any customer survey
of their own to provide support of their claim that their mark has secondary
meaning, despite ample time, resources and motivation to do so.%;t56
"[A]lthough AFLAC suggested it would submit survey evidence at the
preliminary injunction hearing, it did not have time to complete the survey
and presented no survey evidence." (denying preliminary injunction) 5 7).
Thus, the judge noted the absence of surveys in these cases and indicated
that the evidence was weakened by its absence. Of course, neither we nor
the judge could know whether a survey would have changed the outcome of
the case or whether a survey was actually conducted and not presented, but
the court found the absence of a survey to be an omission worth noting.
Among the six remaining cases, in one case, the plaintiff actually
submitted a survey, but it was stricken as untimely. 58 In a second, the court
denied summary judgment for the defendant who pointed to differences
between the marks of plaintiff Sam's Wines & Liquors and defendant Wal-
mart's Sam's Wholesale Club. 159 Although not explicitly referring to the
absence of a survey, the court noted "[T]he defendant has failed to produce
evidence showing that the consuming public would not be confused by the
similarities between the marks."'' 60  Only four cases did not fall in any of
these categories. This analysis of reported no-survey cases thus suggests
that many of them lacked surveys for good reasons, or that the lack of a
survey was potentially detrimental to the strength of the case.
155. Planet Hollywood, Inc. v. Hollywood Casino Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 815, 866, 905 (N.D.
Ill. 1999).
156. J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. Nestle USA, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 136, 153 (D.N.J. 2001).
157. Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 685, 690 (N.D. Ohio 2002); see
also Int'l Data Grp. v. Ziff Davis Media, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 422, 438, 441 (D. Del. 2001)
(denying preliminary injunction, finding that "[tjhis does not preclude IDG from later introducing
evidence, such as survey data, that demonstrates actual confusion of consumers or advertisers");
Am. Auto. Ass'n v. AAA Auto. Club of Queens, Inc., No. 97 CV 1180, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8892, at *22 n.I1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1999) (granting preliminary injunction, finding "deliberative
infringement in this case (in addition to some evidence of actual confusion)" and noting that
"[n]either side has offered surveys or market research"); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc.,
78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1083 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (granting summary judgment to defendant, finding
that "[p]laintiff has presented no empirical evidence (either anecdotal or survey) to show that there
is actual confusion among consumers"); Sea-Roy Corp. v. Parts R Parts, No. 1:94CV00059, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21809, at *107 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 1997) ("Plaintiffs in this case, like the
competitor in Glover, could have offered evidence (on genericism] in the form of consumer
surveys.").
158. Golden W. Fin. v. WMA Mortg. Servs., No. C 02-05727, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4100,
at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2003).
159. Sam's Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 92 C 5170, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12394, at *3, *16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1993).
160. Id. at *8.
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We turn now to our survey of trademark attorneys for some further
insights on the pretrial decisions that lead or do not lead to the presentation
of a survey in court.
IV. The INTA Survey-Introduction
As far as we can tell, this is the first attempt to empirically measure the
use of survey evidence in the prelitigation context. Almost all of the
literature has complained of this missing gap in the empirical studies.
1 61
We surveyed a large body of trademark attorneys and professionals with a
brief questionnaire designed to elicit information about how, if at all, they
have used surveys at any stage of litigation and what kinds of effects the
surveys have had. We found ample evidence to suggest that surveys enjoy
a substantial life before trial as critical evaluative and leveraging tools. In
short, we found that survey use at trial is just the tip of the iceberg.
1 62
A. Eligible Survey Participants
To uncover the role that surveys may play before a formal court action
occurs, we could not use court files. 163  As the gatekeepers who decide
whether or not to commission a survey, attorneys were the logical source of
information on these preceding-decision stages, so a survey of practicing
attorneys was a sensible methodological approach to take. The Inter-
national Trademark Association (INTA) graciously agreed to send emails to
its members inviting them to participate in the survey. As the leading
global association of trademark owners and professionals in the world,
INTA offered access to a large group of active trademark attorneys and
professionals. 164
Using their membership list, INTA sent invitations to their members in
November 2013, inviting them to participate in the survey.165 Although the
161. See, e.g., Bird & Steckel, supra note 6, at 1047.
162. Thus, confirming Bird & Steckel's observation. Id. at 1036 ("Although we cannot say
for certain, what we observe in the federal court system may merely be the 'tip of the iceberg' of
survey usage in trademark-related disputes.").
163. Even PACER files would not disclose these cases.
164. About INTA, supra note 8; see also Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies,
2011 Wis. L. REV. 625, 655 n. 177 (noting that the INTA is the largest trademark organization).
165. The invitation was sent out on November 8 (with a follow-up sent on November 20) and
read as follows:
Dear INTA Member,
INTA is pleased to facilitate an online survey being conducted by Dr. Shari Diamond
and Professor David Franklyn, on behalf of the McCarthy Institute for Intellectual
Property and Technology Law.
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INTA membership does not include attorneys who only occasionally handle
a case involving a trademark issue and does include many attorneys who
specialize in nonlitigation trademark matters, the membership includes a
substantial number of attorneys who are frequently involved in trademark
litigation. 166
B. An Overview of the Survey
The survey included eighteen questions gauging the respondents'
experience, if any, with surveys, as well as their occupational background
and geographic location. The first question asked whether the respondent
had ever commissioned or conducted a survey for a trademark or deceptive
advertising matter. Respondents could answer: (1) no; (2) yes, as a lawyer;
or (3) yes, as a consultant. Respondents were then asked what factors they
considered in deciding whether or not to commission a survey. This was an
open-ended question that called on respondents to describe the determinants
of their decision without suggesting categories that they might have chosen
if the choice was offered, but which did not spontaneously occur to them as
a primary consideration.
The next set of questions asked respondents to think of the most recent
case in which they had commissioned a survey. First, we asked which
issues were involved: likelihood of confusion, secondary meaning,
"genericness," deceptive advertising, dilution, and/or other. We then asked
respondents to identify what happened with the survey (inviting them to
check as many as were applicable):
(1) the results helped to convince my client not to pursue a claim;
(2) the results helped to convince my client to settle the case;
From the researchers:
The McCarthy Institute-Center for the Empirical Study of Trademark Law-is
conducting a survey of INTA members worldwide to determine the ways in which
consumer perception surveys are used (or not used) in trademark disputes. It is an
anonymous survey. Please click on the link below to take the survey. It should take
less than 10 minutes of your time. Kindly complete the survey no later than Monday,
November 18. A summary of the survey results will be published in The Trademark
Reporter as part of a study that is being undertaken by Dr. Shari Diamond of
Northwestern University School of Law and David Franklyn of the McCarthy
Institute.
Thank you very much,
Shari Seidman Diamond & David Franklyn (emphasis omitted).
166. See Grinvald, supra note 164 (explaining that, although "it is difficult to estimate the
number of trademark attorneys in the United States," in 2010 there were "approximately 2,218
U.S.-based attorneys who are members of the International Trademark Association").
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(3) the results helped to convince the opposing party not to
pursue a claim;
(4) the results helped to convince the opposing party to settle;
(5) the survey was presented in a preliminary injunction hearing;
(6) the survey was presented at trial; and
(7) other.
Following this question, we asked respondents to assess the effect of
the survey on the outcome of the case. We then asked the respondent to
indicate whether their client in this survey was a plaintiff or defendant.
Our next set of questions focused on the opposing party. We asked
whether the opposing party had conducted a survey and repeated the same
questions regarding the issues, outcome, and effect of the survey.. We
closed the survey with a set of more general questions asking how long the
respondent had practiced law, how many surveys they had commissioned,
how many had been presented at trial, where they practiced law, and what,
if any, changes they would like to see in the use of surveys. The Appendix
provides the exact wording of all of the survey questions.
C. Results of the Survey
We set out to explain the apparent inconsistency between conventional
wisdom regarding the importance in trademark cases and the empirical
findings provided by Beebe and by Bird and Steckel indicating low survey
use. We found that not only are surveys widely used in pretrial stages, but
that the attorneys who commission them generally perceive their impact as
quite influential on the outcome of the case.
1. The Respondents.-Of the 465 respondents, 335 identified as
practicing attorneys (79 identified as "other" and 51 did not indicate their
occupation). 167 Two of the practicing attorneys were survey consultants, so
we did not include them in the sample of practicing attorneys.
Of the 333 practicing attorneys, 172 (52%) practiced law in the United
States and the remaining attorneys practiced in 56 other countries. The U.S.
practicing attorneys had practiced law for an average of 20.3 years
167. INTA's membership includes over 6,600 organizations from 190 countries. About INTA,
supra note 8. Members include brand owners, law firms, nonprofits, government agency
members, professors, and student members. Id. As a result, it is hard to assess the response rate
of relevant respondents who received the email invitation, that is, attorneys who are engaged in
trademark or deceptive advertising litigation. Although the survey yielded a substantial number of
respondents, we assume that the response rate is quite low and we have no way to assess how
representative it is of the population of attorneys who litigate trademark matters. Thus, although
the practicing attorneys in the sample do reflect a range of seniority and experience, the numbers
we report should be viewed with that caution in mind.
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(median = 20 years), and the non-U.S. practicing attorneys had practiced for
an average of 17.3 years (median = 16 years).
An additional 13 respondents who completed the survey said they had
commissioned or conducted a survey as a survey consultant.
2. Use of Surveys.-More than half of the 333 practicing attorneys
indicated that they had commissioned at least one survey. Of the 172 who
said they practiced law in the United States, 96 (55.8%) reported they had
commissioned at least one survey. Of the 145 attorneys in the United States
sample who reported they had been in practice at least eight years, 61.4%
reported having commissioned at least one survey. 168 This group of 145
attorneys averaged 7.2 surveys per attorney; amongst the 96 who had
commissioned at least one survey, the average was 11.8 per attorney. Thus,
although a majority of attorneys reported that they used surveys on
occasion, the numbers suggest that they do not use surveys in every case.
We do, however, have evidence that an exclusive focus on surveys
presented at trial would substantially underestimate how often surveys are
commissioned in trademark and deceptive advertising litigation. We asked
respondents how many trademark or deceptive advertising surveys they had
commissioned and how many of the commissioned surveys had been
presented at trial. On average, 19.2% of surveys were presented at trial
(median = 11.2%). Some of the surveys may have been presented in a
preliminary injunction hearing, but the rest would not be reflected in a
formal proceeding other than a Daubert motion on admissibility.
169
Another indicator of the role surveys can play in pretrial stages of
litigation comes from the thirteen survey experts in our sample. This was
an experienced group who averaged 92 surveys per respondent
(median = 50) and they reported that 18% (median = 10%) of their surveys
had been presented at trial.
The United States was not alone in survey use. Of the 145 lawyers
who said they practiced law outside the United States, 71 (49%) reported
they had commissioned at least one survey. Because we are interested in
comparing our results with the findings from the studies of federal court
cases described above, we focus our analysis here primarily on surveys
commissioned by U.S. practicing attorneys.
168. When a partner and an associate are working on the same case, the partner will typically
be the one who commissions the survey. We did not ask whether the respondent was an associate
or a partner, but only 25.9% of 27 attorneys who said they had less than eight years of practice
reported having commissioned a survey.
169. For a discussion of survey evidence and Daubert challenges, see generally G. Kip
Edwards, The Daubert Revolution and Lanham Act Surveys, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE
ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN, supra note 24, at 329.
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3. When Attorneys Commission a Survey.-Many factors influence
whether an attorney will commission a survey in a trademark or deceptive
advertising case. Table 1 shows what factors attorneys identified in
response to an open-ended question that asked them to describe what
factors they considered in deciding whether or not to commission a survey.
Respondents were allowed to input multiple factors and describe them in
their own words; we then analyzed each response and categorized it
according to the most relevant factors.
Table 1: Factors Used in Deciding to
Do a Survey-U.S. Practicing Attorneys
Attorneys Attorneys
Factors in deciding who have who have not
to commnission a commissioned commissioned All attorneys
survey a survey a survey
Cost/client 51 25 76
resources (53.1%) (32.9%) (44.2%)
Closeness of 24 1 25
case/other evidence (25.0%) (1.3%) (14.5%)
Value of 18 3 21
mark/stakes (18.8%) (3.9%) (12.2%)
Likelihood result 17 2 19
will favor client (17.7%) (2.6%) (11.0%)
What other side 16 1 16
does/is likely to do (16.7%) (1.3%) (9.3%)
Sufficient time 5 1 6
(5.2%) (1.3%) (3.5%)
Jurisdiction/court 10 4 14
expectation (10.4%) (5.3%) (8.1%)
No factor
mentioned
Total N 96 76 172
The most frequently mentioned consideration was cost or the client's
budget. A majority (53.1%) of respondents who had commissioned a
survey mentioned cost. While only a third of the respondents who had
never commissioned a survey answered this open-ended question, each
named cost as an explanation and few identified any other factors. The
answers given by several of the "no survey" respondents are particularly
telling: "I haven't had a client who was willing to undertake the expense"
and "[u]sually cost and the analysis ends there."
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The second most prominent factor respondents mentioned was the
other evidence in the case. One in four respondents with survey experience
said their decision on whether or not to commission a survey was the
closeness of the case or what other evidence was available. Some of the
respondents gave specific examples: "whether the alleged falsehood is
express or implied"; "whether the confusion factor analysis is close enough
to warrant a survey"; "closeness of the marks"; "whether I have good
evidence of actual confusion." These responses help to clarify why a
survey is not done in every case even when cost is not a key issue: the legal
and factual nature of the case may or may not make a survey useful or even
relevant.
170
A third factor mentioned by a substantial number of respondents was
the value of the mark or the stakes at issue. This factor implicitly reflects
an evaluation of whether it is worth bolstering the strength of the party's
position irrespective of the nature of other available evidence: when the
potential loss would be very harmful, the cost of obtaining additional
evidence that may assist is worth assuming.
The fourth factor frequently mentioned was the likelihood that the
survey results would favor the client. It is of course reasonable for an
attorney to avoid spending client money collecting evidence that will not
assist the client. However, using this criterion as a basis for determining
whether a survey will be done reveals a potential weakness in cases that do
not include a survey.
When courts draw a negative inference from the absence of a
survey, 171 they may in part be reflecting a suspicion that the party did not
produce a survey for one of two reasons: either the party anticipated a
negative result and did not do a survey or a survey was done but the results
did not favor the party. 172  Although it is standard practice in survey
research to pretest questionnaires before fielding a survey in order to ensure
that respondents will understand the questions, 173 conducting pilot work in
170. Note, however, that in a deceptive advertising case, the court may not see a claimed false
statement as literally false so that a party who lacks a survey to assess the message conveyed by
the advertisement may be taking a risk in relying on literal falsity.
171. E.g., Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1994).
172. Surveys are protected from discovery by attorney-client privilege. See, e.g.,
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 32:179 (discussing the level of protection afforded surveys under
work-product doctrine).
173. See Standards and Guidelines for Statistical Surveys, OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET § 1.4
(Sept. 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/statpolicy/standardsstat
_surveys.pdf (specifying that to ensure that all components of a survey function as intended,
pretests of survey components should be conducted unless those components have previously
been successfully fielded); Best Practices, AM. ASS'N FOR PUB. OP. REs. § 6,
http://www.aapor.org/Best -Practicesl.htm ("High quality surveys and polls always provide
adequate budget and time for pretesting questionnaire(s) and field procedures.").
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the trademark context may also warn the party that conducted the pilot work
that a survey will not produce favorable results. Thus, in some cases, courts
may be correct in drawing a negative inference from the absence of a
survey. That is, a party may not conduct, or at least may not produce, a
probative survey precisely because the evidence would not favor that party.
Four of the U.S. respondents (and two non-U.S. respondents) explicitly
mentioned this role for pilot surveys.
Finally, the fifth factor that respondents mentioned with some
frequency was what the other side does or is likely to do. Attorneys faced
with an opposing survey see themselves at risk if they do not have empirical
evidence to counter the opposing party's survey results. Our results from
attorneys reporting on their most recent case provide some evidence that an
unopposed survey may be more influential than one that is opposed.
174
4. The Nature of Surveys in Litigation-To obtain concrete infor-
mation on a sample of recent surveys conducted in trademark and deceptive
advertising litigation, we asked respondents to describe their most recent
case involving a survey. The attorneys in the United States reported that a
majority of the surveys were conducted on behalf of plaintiffs (75.9%), no
doubt reflecting the fact that the plaintiff typically bears the burden of proof
in trademark and deceptive advertising litigation. We expected that
defendants would be more likely to feel the need to conduct a survey if they
knew that the plaintiff had conducted one. And indeed, in cases in which
the respondent reported commissioning the survey on behalf of the
defendant, the attorney was somewhat more likely to report that the
opposing party had conducted a survey (50% versus 31%).
175
As the results in Table 2 indicate, the topic most commonly addressed
in a survey was likelihood of confusion (81.25%). 176 A number of the cases
involved surveys that addressed multiple issues, but nearly one in five cases
involved surveys exclusively addressing an issue other than likelihood of
confusion.
174. See infra section IV(C)(5).
175. In 26% of the cases with plaintiff surveys and in 27% of the cases with defendant
surveys, the attorney did not know whether or not the opposing party had conducted a survey.
176. Our survey experts reported an even higher rate of likelihood-of-confusion surveys in
their most recent case. Twelve of the thirteen (92%) said that likelihood-of-confusion was at least
one survey issue, although in only five of those cases was it the only survey issue (other issues
were secondary meaning (6%); genericness (2%); deceptive advertising (2%); and dilution (2%)).
The thirteenth expert reported that deceptive advertising was the only survey issue in the most
recent case.
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Table 2:Topic(s) Addressed in the Most
Recent Case Involving a Survey
Topic of survey: N Percentage
Likelihood of confusion 78 81.25%
Secondary meaning 32 33.3%
Genericism 18 18.7%
Deceptive advertising 15 15.6%
Dilution, including fame and association 19 19.8%
Other 3 3.1%
Total N of cases 96
The sole survey issue in six of the cases was genericism and in another
six cases the sole survey issue was deceptive advertising. In contrast,
dilution surveys in all but one case accompanied a survey assessing the
issue of likelihood of confusion, reflecting the role of dilution claims as a
backup for a claim of likelihood of confusion.1 77 These results show only
the nature of the most recent case in which surveys were conducted and
cannot tell us how often surveys are commissioned when a case involves a
question of genericism or deceptive advertising. The results do reveal that
the role of surveys in trademark and deceptive advertising litigation will be
underestimated if we focus exclusively on cases involving likelihood of
confusion.
5. Survey Effects in Litigation.-To gauge the role played by surveys
in the course of litigation, we asked respondents about the outcome of the
survey in their most recent survey case: "What happened with your
survey(s) in this case?" We presented them with six options, tracing the
potential progress of a claim from its earliest stages through trial, and
invited them to choose as many of them as applied. They could also select
"other" and specify what that meant. Table 3 shows how and when the
surveys were used.
177. See generally Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine, supra note 44 (noting that, even
though dilutive harm is always speculative and very difficult to prove, plaintiffs may prevail on
dilution when likelihood of confusion cannot be demonstrated).
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Table 3: Survey Use in the Course of Litigation
Question: What happened with your survey(s) in this case?
Please select as many as apply.
What happened with the survey? N Total N %
Survey convinced my client or opposing party not to 47 54%
pursue the claim or to settle the case:
Convinced client only 26
Convinced opposing party only 20 1 1
Convinced both 1
Survey was presented at preliminary injunction or trial: 31 36%
Presented at preliminary injunction 13
Presented at trial 16
Presented at both 2
Survey was used for "other" purpose: 9 10%
Case settled before trial 1
Unfavorable results 3
Unspecified 1
Excluded by court 2
Results presented at arbitration 1
None of the above 1
Total 87 1100%
The results in Table 3 describe how surveys were used as the litigation
unfolded, revealing substantial activity in the early stages of litigation. In
47 cases, the case ended when the survey convinced one or both parties not
to pursue the claim or to settle the case. This group of cases constitutes
more than half of the 87 cases (54%) in which the attorney provided
outcome information. 178 In contrast, only 31 survey cases (36%) proceeded
to a preliminary injunction hearing, a trial, or both.
We invited respondents to check as many responses as applied, so the
figures in Table 3 provide a conservative estimate of the role of surveys.
They do not completely reflect the supporting role played by surveys in
leading to dropped claims and settlements because the cases in the table
178. We could not determine the role of the survey in the nine cases in which the matter was
still pending (8) or the respondent did not remember (1).
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show only the role of the survey at the point when the case ended. 179 For
example, respondents in four of the thirteen cases (30%) that ended with a
preliminary-injunction hearing also indicated that the survey convinced one
or both parties to settle the case. We do not know whether this occurred
before or after an opinion was written in the case, but if settlement occurred
before an opinion was written, the case would not have appeared in a study
of published cases.'
180
The respondents did not report a direct role for the surveys in all of
these cases, either in settlement or in a court hearing, but several responses
reveal ways that published cases may miss survey activity behind the scenes
apart from stimulating settlement. In three cases, the respondent reported
that the survey was not used because it did not produce favorable results:
"Not helpful but client pursued and prevailed"; "ended up not using at trial
because of bad results"; and "results convinced client to pursue in venue
that would not require a survey." These results did not persuade the parties
to settle, but they influenced the nature of the evidence that was produced in
the course of the litigation.
We also asked each respondent to assess the overall effect of the
survey(s) on the outcome of the case, using a 7-point scale ranging from
I = not at all influential to 7 = extremely influential. Table 4 shows that on
average the respondents rated the survey(s) in their most recent case as
somewhat influential. A moderate rating would have been 4, the midpoint
of the scale. The mean rating was 4.55 and the median 5. Less than one in
four respondents (22.9%) rated the survey(s) at 3 or lower on the scale, and
61.5% rated them 5 or higher.
179. Across all cases, 17 respondents said the survey convinced the client not to pursue the
claim; 20 said it convinced the client to settle; 5 said it convinced the opposing party not to pursue
the claim; and 27 said it convinced the opposing party to settle.
180. We thank David Schwartz for pointing this out.
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Table 4: Perceived Effect of Survey on the Outcome of the Case
Question: What would you say was the overall effect of your
survey(s) on the outcome of the case?
(1 = Not at all influential; 7 = Extremely influential)
What happened with the Mean N Std. Deviation Median
survey?
Led client to settle or not 4.81 26 1.52 5.00
pursue the claim
Led opposing party to settle 5.20 20 1.10 5.00
or not pursue the claim
Led both to settle 5.00 1 - 5.00
Preliminary injunction 5.15 13 1.14 5.00
Trial 4.56 18 2.12 5.00
Pending 3.88 8 1.64 4.00
Other 2.30 10 1.57 1.50
Total 4.55 96 1.74 5.00
To gauge whether surveys were evaluated as more influential at
different stages of litigation (e.g., were they perceived as more influential
when presented at trial?), we compared ratings for the cases disposed of at
different stages of litigation. We found no evidence that surveys were
perceived as more influential when they were presented in a preliminary
injunction hearing (mean = 5.15) or at trial (mean = 4.56) than when they
led to settlement or dropping of claims before trial (mean = 4.81 by client;
mean = 5.20 by opposing party). In each instance, the survey on average
received above-midpoint mean and median ratings. Not surprisingly,
surveys in pending cases generated a more equivocal rating on influence
(mean = 3.88; median = 4): their influence level was still uncertain when
the outcome of the case was not yet determined. Similarly, when a survey
was not used due to an unfavorable result or exclusion by a court, it was
rated well below the midpoint of the scale in influence.
As we might expect, respondents rated an opposing survey as less
influential than the survey they commissioned (4.06 versus 3.23, t (34) =
2.30, p = .028). This tendency to privilege our own work or possessions is
a well-known human characteristic. 181 Yet, in cases in which the
181. See generally Elizabeth Hoffnan & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs.
Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993) (reviewing
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respondent faced an opposing survey, respondents rated their own survey as
less influential than when their survey was unopposed. Respondents rated
the influence of an unopposed survey at 4.84 and the influence of an
opposed survey at 4.06 (t= 2.01, p < .05). We would expect this difference
if a well-conducted opposing survey raises doubts about a survey that
provided conflicting results, but it is also possible that cases with and
without opposing surveys differ on other dimensions as well.
Research on reported cases suggests that only a small percentage of
survey cases in trademark litigation involve opposing surveys (8/89 cases =
9%).182 Our attorney survey finds that opposing surveys may be more
common than the pattern in the published cases would suggest. We asked
respondents whether the opposing party had conducted a survey in their
most recent case. Although respondents did not know whether the
opposing party had done a survey in 26% of the cases, they reported that an
opposing survey had been done in 36.5% of the cases. Even if we look only
at the cases involving likelihood of confusion, respondents reported an
opposing survey in 32.1% of them. It is unclear why reported cases should
be less likely to include dueling surveys, but this difference again suggests
that the litigation landscape may not be fully captured in an analysis of
reported cases.
V. Implications of the Attorney Survey Results
Our attorney survey helps to explain why contemporary scholarship
reveals relatively low survey use in reported trademark decisions. Our
results indicate that surveys are used heavily in pretrial assessments and
strategic decision making. 183 They play key roles in claim evaluation and
are understood by attorneys as an influential settlement tool for both
sides. 184  Therefore, many surveys are never reported because they
effectively contribute to pretrial resolution.
We also find that the primary driving force affecting survey use is cost.
Clients who may benefit from surveys are potentially priced out of court.
Furthermore, they may be unable to extract an advantageous settlement
without the aid of a survey. The key issue going forward will be cost
research showing "people value commodities more when they own the commodities than when
they do not"); Dale T. Miller & Michael Ross, Self-Serving Biases in the Attribution of Causality:
Fact or Fiction?, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 213 (1975) (analyzing evidence of "self-serving biases in
perception[s] of causality"); Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980) (coining the term "endownment effect" for the principle that
people tend to value goods more when they own them than when they do not).
182. Bird & Steckel, supra note 6, at 1035.
183. See supra Table 3 (54% of surveys used in settlement and claim evaluation).




management and hopefully new survey products and innovations that will
give more litigants access to these critical tools when they are needed.
A. Why Reported Cases Underrepresent the Role of Surveys
Authors gauging the influence of surveys in trademark litigation by
analyzing reported case outcomes have been correct to express unease about
whether their results fully capture the role played by surveys in these cases.
Fifty years ago, Karl Llewellyn warned against the "threat of the
available"-his concern that researchers would "mistake the merely
available, the easily seen, for all there is to see."'185  Court decisions
resulting in published opinions are the easily seen portion of litigation, but
the majority of claims do not reach that stage.
Our survey of trademark attorneys helps assess the role played by
surveys in publicly invisible stages of litigation. The results suggest that
surveys often play an important role in the course of litigation that is not
detectable in studies of reported cases that reach their final disposition in
formal court actions. The attorneys reported not only that surveys are
influential, but also that in a majority of cases involving surveys, the results
of the surveys help to convince parties to drop claims or to settle. It is
significant that surveys affect not only the opposing party's willingness to
drop a claim or settle, but are also used to convince a client not to pursue a
claim or to settle.
Is there a selection bias in the cases that are not resolved until formal
court action occurs? It is widely acknowledged that the process of
winnowing disputes for litigation is not random, 186 and although the exact
nature of the selection process is in dispute, most models assume that the
fraction of cases going to trial declines as uncertainty about the trial
outcome declines. 187 Thus, if a survey produces convincing evidence for or
against either party, that evidence should reduce uncertainty and make trial
less likely. We would expect then that some of the most convincing
surveys never appear in reported cases because the claims that generated
those surveys are dropped or settled before a preliminary injunction hearing
or trial produces a court opinion.
B. A Survey for Every Case?
Several authors reporting on the frequency of surveys that appear in
published cases have expressed surprise that survey evidence was not
185. Karl N. Llewellyn, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method: A Realist's Critique, in
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 77, 82 (1962).
186. E.g., Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes: New
Evidence Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 103 (1999).
187. Id. at 102 n.2.
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offered in most cases. 88 Their surprise is in part understandable in light of
court commentary identifying survey evidence as the most direct evidence
that can be offered in trademark cases. 189 And indeed, a well-conducted
survey can offer strong probative evidence on consumer perception that is
hard to duplicate in other ways. Although part of the reason why surveys
are not the norm in published cases may be a larger role for surveys in cases
that are resolved before formal court dispositions, there are other
explanations as well.
Both our attorney survey results and our close analysis of the Austin
sample of no-survey cases' 90 provide several reasons why litigants do not
produce survey evidence in every trademark case. Some of these reasons
reflect the nature of the other evidence in the case. If reliable evidence of
actual confusion is available, a survey of consumer reaction is redundant.
When marks are highly similar or nearly identical, likely confusion may be
inferred without survey evidence in an appropriate situation. As Sarel and
Marmorstein found, surveys are most influential when marks are
dissimilar.' 9' Similarly, Bird and Steckel found that a credited plaintiff
survey was most influential when other evidence was mixed. 192 It is when
courts are faced with equivocal evidence and there is no survey that they are
likely to mention the absence of survey evidence.
Other reasons why surveys are not always conducted reflect the nature
of trademark litigation. Surveys designed to assess likelihood of confusion,
secondary meaning, or genericism are all special purpose surveys that must
be generated for litigation to address the particular contested issue. There is
no archive of surveys an expert can simply refer to in offering an opinion.
Although some experts are willing to opine on how consumers are likely to
respond to a mark, they cannot, without a survey of responses to that
specific mark, offer more than a hunch about actual consumer response.
Because a survey cannot be generated on the spot, identifying an
appropriate and available expert and conducting a survey within the swift
time frame available in litigation leading to a preliminary injunction hearing
may present an insurmountable challenge.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect about the attorney survey responses
reported here is the prominent role of cost in determining whether to
commission a survey. As others have noted, surveys can be expensive
193
188. See supra Part II.
189. See, e.g., Morrison Entm't Grp., Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 56 Fed. App'x 782, 785
(9th Cir. 2003).
190. See supra Part III.
191. Sarel & Marmorstein, supra note 59, at 1432.
192. Bird & Steckel, supra note 6, at 1041.
193. E.g., Robert H. Thornburg, Trademark Survey Evidence: Review of Current Trends in
the Ninth Circuit, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 715, 717 (2005) ("[S]urvey
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and, as many of our attorney respondents indicated, the expense may deter a
litigant from commissioning a survey that can provide relevant and
probative evidence on consumer perceptions not easily obtained from other
sources. The future of survey research in trademark litigation is likely to be
affected by the ability to reduce costs while maintaining defensible
quality.
194
Nonetheless, the choice not to conduct or present a potential probative
survey may also stem simply from adversarial strategy. If predicted or
obtained survey results would not support the claim of the party that
commissioned the survey, the trial court is unlikely to see those findings, so
they will not appear in any court opinion.
C. Judicial Responses to Surveys
As Barton Beebe's results revealed, just because a survey is presented
in court does not mean that the court will find it persuasive. 195 If dueling
surveys are presented, the court must decide if either one is persuasive. As
with any expert testimony, the court's task can be difficult and judges
sometimes complain about the quality of the survey evidence they
receive. 196  Although we know of no systematic analysis of how often
courts are misled by surveys (or any other expert testimony), there is no
doubt that courts are sometimes leery of survey evidence and sometimes
credit weak surveys and fault strong ones.
The most recent iteration of judicial complaints about surveys in
trademark cases, and the most sweeping, comes from Judge Richard
Posner. 197 Although he affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary
injunction based on the similarity of the logos and the products and
channels of distribution, he called survey evidence "prone to bias."' 98 He
noted (correctly) the wide variety of survey designs, none foolproof, and
worried that parties may suppress bad results and that experts can be
biased.199 He then offered a series of criticisms of the plaintiffs survey.
experts in California charge between $450 to $600 per hour and require support staff billing at
rates ranging between $200-300 in orchestrating the actual surveys.").
194. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 32:196 (observing that "accurate and scientifically
precise surveys" are not always introduced because they are costly and litigants are better off not
using a survey than using a survey "obtained on the cheap.").
195. Beebe, supra note 6, at 1641.
196. See, e.g., J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. Earthgrains Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 358, 370 (D.N.J.
2002); Learning Network, Inc. v. Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789 (D. Md.
2001); Nat'l Football League Props., Inc. v. ProStyle, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 665, 667-68 (E.D. Wis.
1999).
197. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d 735,
741-43 (7th Cir. 2013).
198. Id. at 741.
199. Id.
2064 [Vol. 92:2029
Trademark Surveys: An Undulating Path
Kraft Foods, the source of Cracker Barrel brand cheese, sued Cracker
Barrel Old Country Store when they began selling hams in the same
grocery stores that carried Kraft's Cracker Barrel cheese. 200 Kraft argued
that consumers were likely to confuse the similar logos and then blame
Kraft for any dissatisfaction.20 ' In the plaintiffs survey, respondents were
shown the allegedly infringing ham and asked whether the company that
makes it also makes other products-and if so what products.0 2 Judge
Posner properly observed that the respondents might be just guessing when
they responded, "cheese" (presumably due to the notion that ham and
cheese go together).0 3
But the survey did not stop there. Respondents in a control group were
shown a ham without the allegedly infringing mark and they did not give a
"cheese" response.20 4 The survey-experiment thus isolated the effect of the
name Cracker Barrel in producing the cheese response in the test cell. In
view of the identical use of Cracker Barrel on the two products, this
evidence was highly relevant evidence of likelihood of confusion.
Judge Posner, however, would have preferred to have sales evidence
that would reflect the extent of consumer confusion in the actual
marketplace. °5 His hypothetical study would require, among other things,
control of sufficient purchasing settings to manipulate placement of
products or a purchasing environment that happened naturally to provide at
least quasi-random variation in whether the store carried the allegedly
infringing product or, if it did, how closely the products were placed in the
store. It is hard to imagine that this study could be carried out under
appropriately controlled conditions and produce defensible conclusions
about the cause of differences or lack of differences between conditions, let
alone that it could be conducted in a reasonable period of time. More
importantly, in view of the strength of Kraft's Cracker Barrel mark for
cheese, there is no reason to think that proximity to Cracker Barrel cheese
in the store would affect consumers' expectation that the ham was put out
by the makers of Cracker Barrel cheese. Even Judge Posner acknowledged
doubts about the reliability of such a study, and admitted that the design he
proposed would have been impossible in the current case when few of the
allegedly infringing products had yet appeared in stores.
206
200. Id. at 736-37.
201. Id. at 742.
202. Id.
203. Id. ("The respondents may have assumed that a company with a logo that does not
specify a particular food product doesn't make just sliced spiral ham. So now they have to guess






Reliable survey evidence provides precisely the evidence that is
needed when actual confusion or sales diversion data are unavailable. If no
such actual confusion or sales diversion evidence exists, judges are forced
to turn to their own reactions to the marks in assessing actual confusion.
But as Judge Posner acknowledged, "judges and jurors have their own
biases and blind spots. 20 7 Not only may a particular judge's reaction be
idiosyncratic, it may also be quite different from the reactions of members
of the relevant consumer population for the products or services at issue.
Judge Jerome Frank recognized the weakness of judicial perception in a
1948 trademark case that the publishers of Seventeen magazine brought
against the makers of "Miss Seventeen" girdles.2 °8 He observed that in the
absence of a test of the reactions of "numerous girls and women," the trial
court's finding as to what was likely to confuse was "nothing but a surnise,
a conjecture, a guess," noting that "neither the trial judge nor any member
of this court is (or resembles) a teen-age girl or the mother or sister of such
a girl., 20 9 It is an all-too-human response for a judge to presume that others
will share the judge's reactions. A survey, if properly designed, can
correct judicial misimpressions.
Judge Posner's reaction to surveys reflects a judicial unease that is
sometimes visible in other judges and displays the suspicion that Judge
Posner expressed in an earlier case when he wrote after critiquing a survey:
"[N]o doubt there are other tricks of the survey researcher's black arts that
we have missed.",21' Judges need to understand the principles of good
survey design and be assured that justifiable methodological choices have
been made in producing the survey evidence they are asked to consider.
D. Moving Forward: What Is/Should Be the Role of Surveys?
The value of surveys to litigants and courts, both now and in the
future, depends on providing clearer standards for good survey design and
educating judges to appreciate those standards and to evaluate the extent to
which a survey measures up to those standards. Respondents to our
attorney survey frequently mentioned both clearer standards and more
207. Id. at 741.
208. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J.,
dissenting).
209. Id. at 976-77.
210. The false consensus effect is a strong and well-established cognitive bias that leads a
person to assume that their own opinions are shared by others. E.g., Gary Marks & Norman
Miller, Ten Years of Research on the False-Consensus Effect: An Empirical and Theoretical
Review, 102 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72, 72-73 (1987); Lee Ross et al., The "False Consensus Effect":
An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 279, 280-81 (1977).
211. Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Bait. Football Club Ltd. P'ship, 34 F.3d 410, 416 (7th
Cir. 1994).
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educated judges in responding to our question about what, if any, changes
they would like to see in the use of trademark and deceptive advertising
surveys.
Some respondents suggested more radical changes. To reduce
potential bias and thus defuse judicial objections to the methodological
decisions made by adversarial experts in designing surveys, several
respondents advocated greater use of court-appointed experts or party-
agreed-upon survey designs (e.g., "the survey should be agreed upon by
both parties to overcome bias"; "both parties pay a neutral party to conduct
a non-biased survey"). These reforms have been suggested by others, but
have not gained traction in the American adversarial system to this point.212
The final frontier is cost. Online surveys offer a potential way to
reduce costs. To the extent that the online survey can reduce costs while
maintaining control, that format offers great promise.213
Conclusion
Surveys may not be ubiquitous in reported cases involving allegations
of likelihood of confusion, but they frequently play a central role in the
progress of trademark and deceptive advertising litigation before cases
appear in court opinions. They are most likely to be commissioned when
other evidence in the case is equivocal, which is precisely when they are
most likely to influence decisions.
Surveys are valuable tools in trademark litigation, even when they are
not deployed in trial. They provide an important reality check on mark
evaluation and effective leverage in settlement negotiations. Surveys help
inform clients and shape strategy with insight into actual consumer
perceptions and their legal significance.
The future of surveys in trademark litigation is likely to depend on the
quality of survey design as well as better-educated trademark attorneys,
experts, and judges. The tools of survey design have been improving over
time (e.g., shifting from surveys to survey-experiments with control
groups), producing better options than the designs that were common when
surveys were first used in trademark cases. Ample business opportunity
212. See, e.g., Justice Stephen Breyer, Introduction to REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 1, 6-7 (advocating greater use of court-appointed experts);
Christopher Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 179 (2010) (advocating use of an
intermediary to select qualified experts who will render litigation opinions without knowledge of
which party is asking).
213. See Roger Tourangeau & Shari Seidman Diamond, Internet Surveys for Evaluating
Trademark Infringement and Deceptive Advertising, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE
ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN, supra note 24, at 287, 305 (noting the
reduced cost of web surveys and the probable development of new methods in the future that will
increase control).
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exists for survey firms that can reduce costs while maintaining defensible
quality. There is still room for improvement, but as a window into the
source of relevant consumer reactions to trademarks and allegedly
deceptive advertising, the potential evidentiary value of a well-designed
survey-experiment is unique.
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Appendix-Trademark Survey
(Note: respondents viewed the questions in a slightly different format)
Not all questions were asked of all respondents (e.g., if a respondent
answered No to question 1, the respondent was not asked the questions
about their most recent survey (questions 3-10)).
We are writing to you as a member of INTA to help us better
understand the role that experts and surveys play in litigation. Specifically,
we would like to know what, if any, experiences you have had with surveys
in trademark and deceptive advertising litigation. We are interested both in
cases that did and did not end up going to trial or appearing in judicial
opinions. We would appreciate it if you would complete the following brief
survey (18 questions). We are not asking you to identify any cases or
parties (or experts). All responses will of course be confidential and we
will use the responses only to describe aggregate results. We will be happy
to share our findings with you when our results are compiled.
Thanks very much,
Shari Seidman Diamond & David Franklyn
Question 1: Have you ever commissioned or conducted a survey for a
trademark or deceptive advertising matter?
El Yes, as a lawyer I have commissioned a survey
0] Yes, as a survey consultant I have conducted a survey
0 No
Question 2: What factors do you consider in deciding whether or not to
commission a survey? (Please type your answer below.)
If respondent answered no to Question 1, survey skips to Question 11.
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YOUR MOST RECENT SURVEY(S):
Question 3: Please think of the most recent case in which you commis-
sioned or conducted a survey. What issues were involved? Please select as
many as apply. (If "Other," please specify.)






Question 4: What happened with your survey(s) in this case? Please select
as many as apply.
l The results helped to convince my client not to pursue a claim
LI The results helped to convince my client to settle the case
LI The results helped to convince the opposing party not to pursue a claim
LI The results helped to convince the opposing party to settle the case
l The survey was presented in a preliminary injunction hearing
LI The survey was presented at trial
LI Other
Question 5: What would you say was the overall effect of your survey(s)
on the outcome of the case?
~1 2 3 '4 5 6 7
Not at all O O O Extremely
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Exrmlinfluential influential
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If respondents answered no to Question 7, survey skips to Question 11.
Question 8: What issue(s) did the opposing party's survey(s) address?
Please select as many as apply. (If "Other," please specify.)






Question 9: What happened with the opposing side's survey(s)? Please
select as many as apply.
El The results helped to convince my client not to pursue a claim
El The results helped to convince my client to settle the case
L The results helped to convince the opposing party not to pursue a claim
El The results helped to convince the opposing party to settle the case
El The survey was presented in a preliminary injunction hearing
El The survey was presented at trial
l Other
Question 10: What would you say was the overall effect of the opposing
side's survey(s) on the outcome of the case?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7




Asked of all respondents:
Question 11: Please respond as appropriate given the following choices:
l I have been practicing law for the number of years specified in the box
below:
LI I am not a practicing lawyer. My occupation is as follows:
Questions 12-14 asked only if respondent answered yes to Question 1
(had commissioned or conducted a survey for a trademark or
deceptive advertising matter).
Question 12: In total, how many trademark or deceptive advertising
surveys have you commissioned or conducted?
Question 13: Of those __ total surveys you've commissioned or conducted,
how many have been presented at trial?
Question 14: Are there any changes you would like to see in the use of
surveys in trademark and deceptive advertising litigation? Please describe.
Question 15 asked only if respondent indicated practicing law in response
to Question 11.
Question 15: Where do you practice law?
Li United States
LI Other
Question 16 asked only if respondent had indicated practicing law
outside the United States in response to Question 15.
Question 16: In the country where you practice, are surveys ever used on
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Questions 17-18 asked only if respondent answered yes in response to
Question 16.
Question 17: What issues have these surveys been used to address? Please
select as many as apply. (If "Other," please specify.)






Question 18: In your opinion, should the use of these surveys to address
these issues?
EL Increase
El Stay the same
l Decrease
Thank you for participating in this survey. If you are interested in the
results, please send your email address to Shari Diamond at:
s-diamond@law.northwestem.edu.
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